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1. Introduction 
US withdrawal made the Kyoto Protocol quite toothless in that surplus emission permits from Russia 
and Ukraine more or less could cover permit shortage in all other countries with binding commitments 
in the first commitment period 2008-2012, cf. Hagem and Holtsmark (2001).
1
 However, Russian 
ratification has recently become increasingly uncertain. This threatens to block the Kyoto Protocol 
from entering into force.
2
 As a response to this situation several politicians within EU and in other 
countries with emission caps, have announced that they want their countries to stick to their 
commitments in the Protocol also in the case that Russia does not ratify.
3
 The purpose of this paper is 
to provide a numerical assessment of consequences of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without 
Russian participation with respect to permit prices and environmental benefits.  
 
Although the Kyoto Protocol as a legal instrument to the Climate Convention will not enter into force 
if Russia decline to ratify, the remaining countries are free to launch a regional multilateral agreement 
based on the obligations and rules of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords. As a starting 
point we analyze a situation where the EU-25-countries as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Norway, 
Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand and Canada stick to their Kyoto-commitments and are parties to a 
regional "mini-Kyoto" agreement. However, the political enthusiasm for the Kyoto Protocol appears to 
be greatest within Europe.  We therefore, secondly, analyze an agreement where Japan, New Zealand 
and Canada also opt out if Russia and Ukraine do so. In that case the agreement is implemented 
basically within an extended EU-region, as Bulgaria and Romania hope to be EU-members from 2007. 
 
With respect to the Kyoto-mechanisms, we have assumed that the regional agreement adopts the rules 
for emissions trading and joint implementation. As regards the Clean Development Mechanism 
                                                     
1 A number of articles have emphasized the Russian role as a large permit seller which is likely to restrict its permit selling in 
order to bring about somewhat higher permit prices, a policy which also would strengthen the environmental effect of the 
agreement, cf. Babiker et al. (2002), Buchner et al. (2002) , Böhringer (2002), Böhringer and Löschel (2003), Chen (2003), 
den Elzen and den Moor (2003), Grütter et al. (2002), Holtsmark (2003), Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002), Manne and Richels 
(2001), Nordhaus (2001), and Springer and Varilek (2003). 
2 The terms for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force were designed as a two-triggered approach. First, the Protocol will have 
to be signed by at least 55 countries to enter into force. This has already been achieved by a wide margin. Currently (March 
2004) some 121 countries, mostly developing, have ratified the Protocol. The other condition for entering into force is, 
however, trickier to fulfill. It requires industrialized countries listed in Annex B in the Protocol responsible for at least 55 per 
cent of CO2 emissions from these countries in 1990 to ratify the Protocol. As of March 2004, with three exceptions, all 
industrialized countries with emission caps had ratified the Protocol. The three exceptions are Australia, Russia, and USA. 
The ratifying countries make up 44 percent of total Annex B emissions in 1990. The Russian share of the relevant CO2-
emissions is 17 percent. Given non-participation by USA, entry into force depends on Russia ratifying the agreement. 
Without a Russian ratification, the Kyoto Protocol will not enter into force as intended. 
3 As a parallel to these political proposals, there is an emerging theoretical discussion of compliance and enforcement issues 
regional climate agreements, cf. for example Bretteville et al. (2004). 
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(CDM), which allows the industrialized countries with emission caps to obtain additional emission 
permits through funding of abatement projects in developing countries, we analyze cases that take this 
mechanism into account. However, it is not obvious whether it is reasonable to assume that a regional 
"mini-Kyoto" is likely to adopt this mechanism. The reason is that inclusion of CDM in a regional 
agreement would imply that also the developing countries had to be involved in the preceding 
negotiations. That would increase the number of parties to the agreement considerably, which in turn 
might delay the negotiations. From that point of view, a "mini-Kyoto" agreement might be a more 
realistic option if it does not include CDM. On the other hand, without permit supply from CDM the 
implementation costs will increase considerably, and therefore possibly shrink the number of parties 
with emission caps that are willing to stick to their Kyoto-commitments.  
 
This article applies a partial equilibrium model of the permit market under the Kyoto Protocol and the 
fossil fuel markets. The demand and supply of fossil fuels give rise to the demand and supply of 
emission allowances and implicitly abatement costs as lost 'consumers’ surplus'. It is not least 
important that the model include three regional gas markets in order to realistically take account of 
differing equilibrium effects from the fossil fuel markets in Western Europe, North America and the 
Pacific region. The inclusion of a regional market for gas in Europe is furthermore important in the 
present analysis, as it allows us to take into account strategic behaviour of Russia in the permit market 
when Russian interests in the European gas and oil markets also are taken into consideration. This is 
important with regard to Russian withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, which in this model framework 
means that the permit market turns from being dominated by one seller to a competitive market. The 
model is further described in Holtsmark (2003), see also Holtsmark and Mæstad (2002) and Hagem 
and Holtsmark (2001) for applications of a simplified version of the model. 
 
Due to weak data and in order to enhance analytical transparency we restrict ourselves to emissions of 
CO2 only, thus neglecting the other greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol. The percentage 
reduction targets specified in the Protocol are consequently applied to the CO2 emissions alone. 
According to Babiker et al. (2002) overestimation of abatement costs and underestimation of the 
permit supply may result. The permit price estimates might from that point of view be biased upwards.  
The analysis is based on the scenarios for fossil fuel consumption set out in the International Energy 
Outlook (DOE 2002) issued by Energy Information Administration, US Department for Energy. DOE 
(2002) provides high growth and low growth scenarios in addition to a medium growth scenario. 
While the medium growth scenario doubtless represents the scenario makers’ central expectations, the 
high and low alternatives probably indicate the degrees of uncertainty associated with projections of 
5 
this nature. As a rule, emission forecasts from DOE have tended to be somewhat higher than 
corresponding forecasts from IEA. However, the differences are small compared to the degrees of 
uncertainty related to such scenarios, cf. Vrolijk and Grubb (2000) where the high degree of 
uncertainty related to emission projections is emphasized. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the general features of the model. Section 3 sets 
out the three applied baseline scenarios of the fossil fuel markets. Section 4 presents model 
simulations with respect to five cases. The first case assumes that the Kyoto Protocol is implemented 
with Russian/Ukrainian participation, while the four remaining cases assume that Russia and Ukraine 
have withdrawn from the agreement.
4
 The differences between these four last cases are related to 
permit supply from CDM and the number of participating countries. Section 5 concludes.
 
 
2. Description of the model 
The analysis applies a static partial equilibrium model that incorporates the links between the fossil 
fuel markets and a market for emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol
5
. There are five markets for 
fossil fuels in the model: global oil and coal markets and, and, due to high transport costs, three 
regional gas markets (North America, Europe including Russia and Algeria, and the Pacific region). 
The model does not include markets for non-fossil energy. Inclusion of a market for renewable energy 
would be an interesting extension of the model reserved for future works. 
 
The version of the model used here divides the world into 12 countries/regions.
6
 The three fossil fuels 
are modelled as substitutes in the demand functions. The assumed production technology yields linear 
demand functions for all inputs. The consumer prices are equal to the sum of producer prices, end-user 
taxes and the price of emission permits.  
 
                                                     
4 Although Ukraine finally ratified the Kyoto Protocol in February 2004, we have in this paper assumed that Ukraine would 
choose to opt-out if Russia does not ratify. However, Ukrainian participation in some sort of a mini-Kyoto, as analysed in this 
paper, could be very attractive for this country due to its considerable amounts of hot air and prospects of higher permit 
prices. An interesting case not analysed in this paper would therefore be inclusion of Ukraine as a party to a type of mini-
Kyoto-agreements. That would mean somewhat lower permit prices and smaller environmental effect of implementation.  
5 In the numerical model applied in this paper FSU is not split into the different Annex B parties. Hence, it has not been 
possible to take into account that the three Baltic states have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and should be assumed to be parties 
also to the new agreement. However, due to these countries minor economic importance, this inaccurate simplification should 
not affect the results significantly.  
6 USA, Canada, Western Europe, Norway, FSU, other economies in transition (EIT), Algeria, OPEC, Japan, New Zealand, 
Australia, rest of the world. 
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The model includes an international market for emission permits covering the industrialized countries 
that are assumed to accept emissions caps. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is included in 
the model when appropriate by assuming that the developing countries have caps equal to their 
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. An improvement of the version of the model applied here is to 
take transaction costs in CDM into account, cf. the discussion below. 
7
 
 
The gas markets in North America and the Pacific region as well as the international coal market are 
assumed to be competitive. In the European gas market, the oil market and the market for emission 
permits, it would be unrealistic to ignore market power. In the oil market it is therefore assumed that 
OPEC behaves strategically (acts as a dominant seller) and restricts its oil supply in order to maximize 
its net revenue while all other suppliers are price takers (a competitive fringe)
8
. Furthermore, in the 
European gas market Russia is correspondingly assumed to be a dominant seller and price setter while 
other suppliers (the fringe) are price takers. Concerning the market for emission permits this market is 
assumed to be competitive in the cases where Russia is not taking part. On the other hand, Russia and 
Ukraine is assumed to act as a cartel in the permit market in the cases where these countries are parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The model determines equilibrium prices in the fuel markets and in the market for emission permits 
and determines furthermore the different countries’ and regions’ export and import of fossil fuels and 
emission permits. 
 
The model is calibrated to three “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenarios of world energy markets in year 
2010. The three BAU scenarios are based on the three scenarios set out in International Energy 
Outlook (DOE 2002).  
 
                                                     
7 CDM-projects will imply significant transaction costs. For instance, the investors has to produce an application for project 
approval accompanied by documentation proving that the projects are “additional”, which means that the projects would not 
be carried out on a commercial basis. Furthermore, there has to be negotiations between the host and the investors. The size 
of these transaction costs influences the elasticities of permit supply from CDM. Because Russian withdrawal from the 
Protocol would imply that Russian permit supply to some extent has to be replaced by permit supply from CDM, the CDM-
model is therefore important for the results with respect to the estimated permit price. In order to improve the model it is 
therefore here assumed that there will be an average transaction on CDM-projects of 1.7€/tCO2. Because this numerical 
assumption could be questioned, an appendix provides sensitivity analyses w.r.t. the size of these transaction costs. Because 
the version of the model applied in Holtsmark (2003) did not include any transactions costs, the permit supply from CDM 
will be somewhat smaller in the version of the model applied in this paper. Nevertheless, the difference the simulated permit 
supply from CDM is in resonable accordance with the CDM-studies by Chen (2003) and Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002). 
8 OPEC is assumed to have constant marginal costs while all other suppliers have increasing marginal costs. In the European 
gas market FSU correspondingly has constant marginal costs while the other producers have increasing marginal costs. 
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The design of the model means that abatement costs follow implicitly from parameters of the fossil 
fuel demand functions, which in turn follow from the price elasticities and composition of the demand 
for each fuel in each country. There is no consensus in the literature about own-price demand 
elasticities in fossil fuel markets, cf. Smith et al. (1995), Brubakk et al. (1995), Franzen and Sterner 
(1995). However, Aune et al. (2001, 2002) provide a thorough discussion of the relevant literature. In 
the absence of conclusive evidence, we assume initially average own-price elasticities of –0.5 for all 
fossil fuels. Using detailed information from the IEA (1995), the various elasticities are then adjusted 
as described in Holtsmark and Mæstad (2002).  
 
As for fuel supply, it is generally recognized that the supply of coal is more elastic than the supply of 
other fuels. We have followed Golombek et al. (1995) in assuming supply elasticities of 2.0 for coal 
producers and 1.0 for both competitive gas producers and oil producers. Gas supplies from Russia and 
Ukraine and oil supply from OPEC are not determined by explicit supply functions, but instead 
through cartel formations exerting market power in the respective markets. 
 
The supply of permits from CDM turns out to be important when Russia and Ukraine opt-out. The 
chosen modeling of CDM thus should be discussed. CDM is included in the model by assuming that 
non-Annex B-countries have assigned amounts equal to their BAU emissions and are free to take part 
in emissions trading. As CDM is a project-based mechanism, this modeling represents a important 
simplification, although there is assumed transaction costs related to all CDM-projects equal to 
1.7€/tCO2. It is difficult to judge the reliability of this model of CDM. A key question is how the rules 
for project approval will be practiced. Findings in Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002) and Chen (2003) 
indicate that the applied model's estimated CDM potential is reasonable. Nevertheless, because CDM 
is project based, the mechanism rules out the possibility for cost-effective national measures as carbon 
taxes. From that point of view the chosen CDM modeling overestimates the potential for CDM, 
because it may be interpreted as if the developing countries implement carbon taxes in order to be able 
to export permits. Hence, there are reasons to believe that the chosen CDM modeling exaggerates the 
likely supply of permits from this mechanism and that the real market for permits will lie somewhere 
between the simulated cases with and without CDM. On the other hand, there is a risk that several 
CDM-projects will be approved even if they are profitable on a commercial basis, and consequently 
would have been carried out in any case. The executive committee for CDM will have the difficult 
task to evaluate whether projects are “additional” or profitable also without support from the 
mechanism. Due to the complexity of the related issues, it is very likely that the mechanism will give 
8 
rise to the creation of emission credits that not are based on emission reductions in the developing 
countries.  
 
A more detailed description of the model and the applied data set is given in two appendixes in 
Holtsmark (2003). 
3. The scenarios 
The three scenarios set out in the International Energy Outlook 2002 issued by US Department of 
Energy (DOE, 2002) constitute the basis of the constructed baselines. Some key data are presented in 
Table 1. Estimations of regional quotas under the Kyoto Protocol are based on 1990 DOE emission 
data. 
 
Table 1 is useful for comparing the predicted 2010 emissions with respect to the aggregated national 
quotas (assigned amounts). The corresponding differences between the baseline emissions and the 
national/regional assigned amounts, which constitute the required cutbacks without emissions trading, 
are presented in Table 2.
9
  
 
First, we provide some remarks on the case when Russia is party to the Protocol. The predicted 2010 
emissions in the Annex B countries (having emission obligations under the Kyoto Protocol), but 
excluding USA and Australia, are 8820 MtCO2 in the medium growth scenario. The sum of the 
corresponding national quotas is 8854 MtCO2. Hence, the sum of the quotas is larger than the BAU 
emissions in the medium growth scenario, which implies that available hot air from Russia and 
Eastern Europe is larger than net demand for permits in the other countries with caps altogether even 
as the permit price approaches zero, cf. Table 2. On the other hand, in the high growth scenario there 
is a net cutback requirement of 510 MtCO2, which constitutes approximately 2 per cent of the global 
emissions. In the low growth scenario there is a surplus of permits corresponding to 660 MtCO2. This 
means that in the medium and low growth scenarios there will be a positive permit price only if sellers 
                                                     
9 At the Conference of the parties to the Climate Convention in Bonn in 2001 there was made some "additions and 
substractions from the assigned amount of a Party resulting from forest management…" cf. UNFCCC (2001a), p. 11. For 
practical purposes we could consider these as additions or extensions of the assigned amounts (national quotas) specified in 
the Kyoto Protocol, because commercial forest management in these countries is likely to fulfil the conditions set for the right 
to take advantage of these additions. The numerical analysis in this paper is based on these extensions of the national quotas.  
9 
restrict their sales strategically and/or if there is permit demand (or restricted sales) from entities and 
countries that are banking emission allowances for future commitment periods.
10
 
 
The four bottom lines of Table 1 and 2 provide information on the importance of the scale of the 
participation in the agreement.  
 
Second, we note that in the case when Russia is not a party to the Protocol, there will be a significant 
net demand for permits even in the low growth scenario, cf. the bottom lines of Table 1 and 2. Hence, 
if Russia is to withdraw from the Protocol, a positive permit price and a significant global emission 
reduction effect is likely irrespective of what scenario is realized. In the next section we will quantify 
these effects. 
 
Table 1. CO2 emissions in 1990, in 2010, targets and assigned amounts (MtCO2/year) 
 BAU emissions 2010 
 
1990
emissions
Low 
growth 
Med. 
growth
High 
growth 
Kyoto
Target
(per cent)
Assigned 
amounts
*
USA and Australia 5 252 6 986 7 159 7 369 93.8 4 928
Canada 462 598 634 671 103.5 478
Western Europe excl. Norway 3 376 3 604 3 784 3 967 92.6 3 127
Norway 34 48 48 48 105.9 36
Russia and Ukraine 3 047 1 972 2 193 2 393 104.0 3 169
Eastern Europe 1 104 781 854 917 94.0 1 038
Japan 986 1 144 1 258 1 316 98.9 975
New Zealand 28 46 50 52 110.7 31
Non-Annex B countries 7 077 11 620 13 024 15 189    
World 21 366 26 800 29 003 31 922    
Annex B 14 289 15 179 15 979 16 733 94.7 13 782
Annex B excl. USA/Australia 9 037 8 193 8 820 9 364 95.2 8 854
Annex B excl. USA/Australia and Russia 
and Ukraine 5 990 6 221 6 628 6 971 92.8 5 685
EU-27, Sw.land, Island and Norway 4 514 4 433 4 686 4 932 93.1 4 201
Source: DOE 2002 
* Including RMUs from forest management. 
                                                     
10 The analysis does not take explicitly into account that there might be permit demand due to the banking option. Hence, if a 
quite strict new agreement on a second commitment period is negotiated the permit price might be higher in the first 
commitment period than estimated in this paper.  
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Table 2. Absolute required cutbacks (MtCO2/year) 
 Low growth Med. growth High growth  
USA and Australia 2 058 2 231 2 441 
Canada 119 156 193 
Western Europe excl. Norway 477 657 840 
Norway 12 12 12 
Russia and Ukraine -1 197 -976 -776 
Eastern Europe -257 -184 -121 
Japan 169 283 342 
New Zealand 15 19 21 
Annex B 1 398 2 197 2 951 
Annex B excl. USA and Australia -660 -33 510 
Annex B excl. USA, Australia, Russia, 
and Ukraine 536 943 1 286 
EU-27, Switzerland, Island and Norway 232 485 731 
4.  Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without Russia and 
Ukraine 
This section presents model simulations that provide information on the effects of implementation of a 
“mini-Kyoto” Protocol without participation from Russia and Ukraine. As a basis for comparison, one 
case with Russian/Ukrainian participation is also presented. Altogether five cases are defined and 
analyzed, all of which take into account US and Australian non-participation. If nothing is said to the 
contrary, the discussion is related to the medium growth BAU scenario. Emission permit prices are 
measured in €/tCO2.
11
 
 
The upper part of Table 3 sets out the characteristics of the different cases. Case 1 assumes that Russia 
and Ukraine (labeled FSU) are parties to the agreement and act strategically as a cartel in the permit 
market.
12
 The other cases assume that Russia choose not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and that Ukraine 
                                                     
11 Because European countries and companies are going to dominate the permit market under the Kyoto Protocol, we find it 
reasonable to measure permit prices by Euros. The calculations are based on an exchange rate reflecting the current situation, 
where one Euro (€) is equal to 1.17 USD ($). 
12 Case 1 here corresponds to case 5 in Holtsmark (2003). The case assumes that the Russia/Ukraine bears in mind how the 
permit market will influence the oil market and the market for gas in Europe. The point is that the model simulations show 
that both the oil price and the gas price in the European market would drop as the permit price rise. It follows that if 
Russia/Ukraine restricts its permit sales in order to boost profits in the permit market, the profits in the oil and gas industries 
may decline at the same time. If they do so, the simulations indicate that they would probably amplify the permit supply by 
approximately 150 MtCO2, followed by a drop in permit price of approximately 1 €/tCO2. However, the results of case 1 in 
this paper differ somewhat from the results of case 5 in Holtsmark (2003) because the version of the simulation model 
applied in this paper take transactions costs in CDM into account. Such costs where not incorporated into the model applied 
in Holtsmark (2003). 
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then opt-out. In those cases it is instead assumed that the national assigned amounts serve as the basis 
for a new (multilateral) "mini-Kyoto" agreement between the other countries that has ratified the 
Protocol. Different solutions are then possible.  
 
First, the remaining Annex B countries could establish an agreement adopting the full set of assigned 
amounts set out in the Kyoto Protocol as well as rules for emissions trading, joint implementation, 
enforcement and so forth, established in the Marrakech Accords (UNFCC, 2001b). However, without 
participation from the developing countries, CDM has to be ignored. In that case not only permit 
supply from Russia and Ukraine is eliminated. In addition the permit supply from the developing 
countries through CDM is dropped. That scenario is labeled case 2 in the following.  
 
Second, there is a possibility that the developing countries could be involved in a new agreement as 
host countries of CDM-projects. In that case also the rules for CDM specified in the Marrakech 
accords are assumed to apply. This possibility is labelled case 3 in this paper. 
 
The cases 4 and 5 are variations on the cases 2 and 3, respectively, in that also Japan, Canada and New 
Zealand opt-out in these cases. While CDM is included in case 5, case 4 disregards permit supply from 
this mechanism. 
 
Table 3. Case characteristics and estimated permit prices in the various scenarios (€/tCO2) 
Case: 1 2 3 4 5 
Participation from Russia and Ukraine a
 
    
Participation from Japan, Canada, NZ a a a 
 
 
Permit supply from CDM  a  a 
 
a 
Permit price (€/tCO2) in the scenarios/cases:   
Low growth 1.6 11.2 5.5 6.7 3.3 
Medium growth 2.9 18.3 7.9 13.2 5.1 
High growth 3.7 23.8 9.6 18.9 6.6 
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Table 4. Net permit imports in the medium growth scenario. MtCO2 
 Case 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Canada 141 55 114 - - 
Western Europe 602 233 488 351 550 
Russia and Ukraine -698 - - - - 
Eastern Europe -219 -413 -279 -351 -246 
Japan 253 108 208 - - 
New Zealand 18 17 18 - - 
Non-Annex B  -98 - -548 - -303 
Annex B  98 0 548 0 303 
 
Table 5. Emission reductions in the medium growth scenario. MtCO2 
 Case 
 1  2 3 4 5 
USA and Australia -12 -45 -47 -24 -24 
Canada and New 
Zealand 16 102 43 -1 -2 
Western Europe 67 436 181 318 119 
Russia and Ukraine -4 -20 -16 -12 -8 
Eastern Europe 35 230 96 168 63 
Japan 26 171 71 -3 -3 
Non-Annex I 98 -50 548 -25 303 
World 225 824 876 420 448 
 
 
The calculated permit price in the different cases and scenarios is set out in Table 3, while the 
movements in the market for permits in the medium growth scenario are presented in Table 4. The 
estimated emission reductions compared to the BAU-scenarios are set out in Table 5 and 6.  
 
In the following discussion the different cases are compared to the three BAU scenarios described in 
the previous section. If nothing is said to the contrary, the discussion is related to the medium growth 
scenario. 
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Table 6. Global emission reductions in the different cases and scenarios. MtCO2 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low growth 56 470 498 201 213 
Medium growth 225 824 876 420 448 
High growth 367 1133 1208 637 681 
 
Concerning case 1, it is assumed that Russia and Ukraine act as a cartel in the permit market; 
restricting sales in order to maximize the sum of income from permit sales and profits in their oil and 
gas industries, cf. Holtsmark (2003). The estimated permit price of 2.9 €/tCO2 in the medium growth 
scenario in case 1 is in reasonable accordance with most other model-based studies, although at the 
low end, cf. Springer and Varilek (2003). The global emission reductions in case 1 are 225 MtCO2 in 
the medium growth case. This represents less than one percent of global CO2-emissions in this 
scenario. 
 
Table 5 and 6 set out the emission reductions in the different cases. While Table 5 shows regional 
emission reductions relative to the medium growth BAU scenario, Table 6 shows global emission 
reductions in the various cases under different assumptions about the BAU economic growth.  
 
The negative numbers in Table 5 (increased emissions) represent carbon leakage and deserve a 
comment. The relevant mechanism in the model is that the emissions are slightly increased in 
countries without emissions caps when the countries with caps carry out abatement. This carbon 
leakage is due to reduced fossil fuel prices in the new equilibriums. Secondly, the emissions are 
increased within Russia/Ukraine also in the cases where Russia has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The 
reason is that Russia/Ukraine in these cases is not subject to a binding commitment as only a part of 
the stock of hot air permits are sold on the market. Hence, no abatement policy is implemented in 
Russia/Ukraine and consequently there will be some carbon leakage in this region due to lower fossil 
fuel prices at the user end. 
The permit price changes are accompanied by corresponding changes in the behaviour of the permit 
importers and permit suppliers in Eastern Europe. In case 2, where there is no permit supply from 
CDM-projects, the countries in Eastern Europe increase their permit supply by almost 90 per cent 
compared to case 1. At the same time the permit price jumps from € 2.9 to € 18.3. Hence, this case 
may be quite attractive from the point of view of the new EU-members, although the increased permit 
supply is based on domestic abatement.  
 
14 
If, on the other hand, permit supply from CDM is included in the analysis, the corresponding increased 
permit supply from Eastern Europe as a result of the Russian/Ukrainian withdrawal is only 27 percent. 
Moreover, the permit price increase is much smaller in this case. Nevertheless, also this case is 
attractive from the point of view of the countries in Eastern Europe. 
 
The costs of Russian/Ukrainian withdrawal have to be paid by the permit importers: EU, Japan, New 
Zealand and Canada, as well as the smaller countries Norway, Switzerland and Island. Their costs 
will, however, be considerably smaller if the agreement adopts CDM. 
 
Without Russian/Ukrainian participation the environmental effect of a multilateral agreement would 
be larger, cf. Table 5 and 6. The reason is that withdrawal of almost 700 million tonnes of permits 
from the market would imply an increased permit price that makes abatement more profitable. It is 
important to underline that the net environmental effect of the Russian withdrawal cannot be 
calculated on the basis of the national emission quotas alone, but has to be seen in relation to the 
Russian/Ukrainian strategic behaviour in the first place (amount of hot air sold) as well as the degree 
of carbon leakage in the different non-participating regions.  
 
From Table 4 we note that Japan, Canada and New Zealand together represent a considerable share of 
the demand side of the permit market. Hence, as we move to cases 4 and 5, where we assume that 
these three countries opt-out, the permit price drops considerably (compared to cases 2 and 3), cf. 
Table 3. The relative change in total environmental benefit is reduced even more, because the 
profitability of abatement is reduced while the geographical coverage of the agreement is reduced at 
the same time.  
 
From the point of view of the EU-15, case 4 and 5 might nevertheless be politically attractive 
scenarios. In these cases the permit prices are moderate, at least if permit credits from developing 
countries are accepted. At the same time a considerable part of the income from permit sales are 
allocated to the new EU-countries.  
5. Conclusions 
Currently, all Annex B parties except Russia, Australia and USA, have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
With de facto USA and Australia withdrawal, the Kyoto Protocol will only enter into force if it is 
ratified by Russia. It is still very much an open question whether Russia will do so. This paper has 
therefore analyzed some available options given that the Russian government decides not to ratify. 
15 
The paper focuses on the case where the remaining Annex B parties respond to Russian withdrawal by 
the establishment of a new multilateral ("mini Kyoto") agreement by which they commit themselves to 
the emission caps, the rules for emissions trading, compliance etc. set out in the Protocol. We have 
firstly analyzed the case where this multilateral agreement includes all the remaining Annex B parties, 
except Ukraine. Secondly, we have analyzed the case where Japan, Canada and New Zealand are not 
willing to take part in this agreement. In that case the remaining parties consist of only EU-25, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Norway, Island and Switzerland. 
 
Figure 1 sum up the effects of geographical coverage of a "mini Kyoto" agreement on emissions and 
permit prices. We note that as Russia and Ukraine opt-out, the environmental benefit of 
implementation is considerably increased due to the large amounts of hot air, which is then withdrawn 
from the market (case 1 → case 2,3). However, the final result of Russian/Ukrainian withdrawal might 
be that important countries with reduction obligations, such as Japan, Canada and New Zealand, also 
opt-out. To some degree that would neutralize the environmental gain caused by the 
Russian/Ukrainian withdrawal (case 2, 3 → case 4,5). Nevertheless, the environmental effect of an 
agreement involving only in EU-27, Norway and Switzerland is still larger than in case 1, where only 
USA and Australia had left the agreement. 
 
Figure 1:  Global emission reductions (MtCO2) and permit price (€/tCO2) in the medium 
growth scenario. The five cases 
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Figure 1 also illustrates to what extent marginal abatement costs change with respect to geographical 
coverage and the importance of CDM in this respect. As Russia and Ukraine opt-out, the permit price 
increases from € 2.9 to € 7.9. Furthermore, if the permit supply from CDM is eliminated, the permit 
price increases to € 18.3, a six fold increase compared to case 1. Hence, to permit importers as EU, 
Japan and Canada, this “mini-Kyoto” implementation would mean considerably increased costs. If 
also Japan, Canada, and New Zealand opt-out, however, three permit importers are out of the market. 
Consequently, the permit price is reduced to € 5.1 and € 13.2 in cases 5 and 4, respectively. In other 
words, this last alternative would imply smaller costs to EU, which in this case dominates the 
agreement. 
 
From an environmental point of view implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without participation 
from Russia and Ukraine is superior to the full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The reason is 
that no abatement is in likely to be carried out in Russia and Ukraine in any case, because these two 
countries as a result of their large national quotas and exercise of power in the permit market are stuck 
with more emission allowances than needed to legitimate their emissions. Also in the cases where 
Japan, Canada and New Zealand opt-out, which imply implementation of a mini-Kyoto Protocol only 
within EU-27 together with Norway, Island and Switzerland, the solution is environmentally superior 
to the case where the Kyoto Protocol had been implemented with participation from Russia, Ukraine, 
as well. However, after the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the global environmental effect of 
implementation is in any case relatively small.  
 
From a European perspective, case 4 and 5 might seem attractive, since in these cases the costs could 
be considered moderate, while at the same time the new EU-members have considerable gains from 
emissions trading. 
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Appendix 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1 the permit price is quite sensitive to the supply of CDM generated permits. 
Hence, any assessment of the permit market under the Kyoto Protocol has to model CDM carefully. 
Modeling CDM is, however, difficult not least because the mechanism is project based. The fact that 
the mechanism rules out cost-effective measures such as emission taxes implies a loss of cost-
effectiveness. Moreover, there will be additional costs related to the procedures for approval of 
projects, etc. These types of additional costs could all be labeled as transactions costs. An 
improvement of the model applied in this paper compared the model applied in Holtsmark (2003) is 
the incorporation of such transaction costs in relation to CDM. The simulations presented in section 4 
assumed transaction costs equal to 1.7 €/tCO2. Because this numerical choice lacks a firm empirical 
basis, this appendix provides some sensitivity simulations with respect to the size of the transaction 
costs of CDM-projects. The permit price and the global emission reductions are calculated as the 
transaction cost varies from 0 to 3.0 €/tCO2, cf. figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1:  Global emission reductions (left diagram, MtCO2) and permit price ((right  
diagram, €/tCO2) in the medium growth scenario. The cases that include CDM 
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As the transaction cost increases the permit supply from CDM is reduced. Consequently, higher permit 
prices follows, cf. the left diagram of Figure A.1. As the transactions costs are increased from zero to 3 
€/tCO2, the permit price is increased by about 2 €/tCO2, as far as case 3 and 5 are concerned. In case 1 
the permit price increase is less significant. This is because of the role of Russia, which in this case 
behaves as a dominating seller in the permit market. Due to its market power, Russia finds it profitable 
to respond to reduced supply of permit from CDM by increased supply of hot air. This also explains 
while increased transactions costs gives smaller environmental effect of the agreement, cf. the right 
diagram of Figure A.1.  
 
As far as case 3 and 5 are concerned, the level of the transaction costs does not affect the global 
emission reductions, because the permit market in these cases are competitive which means that the 
sum of the assigned amounts (national emission caps) determines the global emission reductions. In 
that setting, reduced supply of permits from CDM has to be compensated by other suppliers. There 
are, however, some small differences with respect to global emission reductions due to leakage effects. 
They are too small to be apparent from figure A.1  
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